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Labour migration is, perhaps, the most widely discussed economic issue today. Yet, 
its underpinning theory and its empirical tests have remained largely Western-
centric. In turn, the causes, effects, and policy options for the substantial, but widely 
neglected, Afro-Chinese labour migration, are poorly understood. By systematising 
existing data, this article shows that Afro-Chinese labour migration experience is far 
more complex than what neoclassical economics suggests. Driven, or, at least 
moulded, not so much by the migrant as a rational utility-maximising individual but by 
holistic processes of ‘circular, combined and cumulation causation’, Afro-Chinese 
migration, and Afro-Chinese relations, more generally, have contributed to economic 
growth, but at the cost of much socio-spatial displacement, and socio-ecological 
degradation. Added to these social costs is widespread labour exploitation. So, the 
insidious attempts by the state, business enterprise, corporate finance, and capital to 
consider migration as a ‘spatial fix’ for economic growth are questionable. Seeking to 
wall out migrants, embarking on widespread surveillance, pursuing migrant scape-
goating, and framing migration as a Malthusian problem are, however, not a 
panacea. The  social costs of migration need to be directly redressed, among others, 
by redesigning the institutions that shape the conditions of labour. Doing so would 
require leaving behind neoclassical economics theories of migration and exposing 
their vested interests. Social economics theories and theorising that more 
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comprehensively addresses the labour migration problematique and strongly 
emphasises the coupling of  migration, economic, and social policy can usefully be 
considered as alternatives. 
 











1.Labour on the Move  
Widespread global labour migration is, perhaps, the most discussed social problem 
today. According to neoclassical economists, it arises from real or perceived 
differences in wages across the world and the result of diverse returns on human 
capital between points of origin and destination (Todaro, 1969; Todaro and Smith, 
2006; for a review, see Burnazoglu, 2017). Labour migrants, the argument 
continues, make rational choices based on  expected income. So, they move when 
the actual or perceived prevailing level of income in the intended destination is much 
higher than their actual current levels of income.  
These ‘economic migrants’, as they are usually called, are ‘pushed’ or ‘pulled’, by 
only material reasons but they are always better off after migration (Ravenstein, 
1885, 1889). In this process, unemployment is only frictional (see also a review by 
Pishé, 2013), the lack of assimilation temporary, and persistent inequality, transient. 
All these problems merely reflect differences in human capital or information 
asymmetry, which melt away with time. Indeed, based on a neoclassical 
interpretation called the ‘Lewis Turning Point’, the typical claim is that migration may 
cause inequality to rise initially, but as migrants earn more and more, inequality 
naturally reduces (for a detailed commentary, see Molero-Simarro, 2017). So, it is 
the effect of labour migration on growth and ‘catch-up’, which are the key criteria for 
judging its success  (Clausing, 2019a, 2019b). 
Typically associated with academic economists (e.g., Clausing, 2019a, 2019b) and 
economic journalists (The Economist, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c), such theories  are also 
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advocated by many prominent social scientists such as M.M. Gordon (e.g., Gordon, 
1961) and many global leaders. This widespread influence of economic ideas recalls 
J.M. Keynes’ famous statement that ‘the ideas of economists…are more powerful 
than is commonly understood…Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite 
exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy 
from some academic scribbler of a few years back’ (Keynes, 1953/1964, p.383). 
Yet, these ideas lack consistent empirical verification. In the case of Afro-Chinese 
labour migration, a substantial and dynamic1 stream of labour migration, at least, 
these issues require investigation. The global literature on migration tends to focus 
on Europe and North America, while the emphasis of most Afro-Chinese studies is 
whether it could be regarded as ‘the new scramble for Africa’ (The Economist, 
2019a).  Questions about Afro-Chinese labour migration are less frequently 
discussed. There are many respectable exceptions (see, for example, Lee, 2014; 
Mohan et al., 2014; Sweetland and Edwards, 2019), of course, but they do not set 
out to engage the economics of labour migration.  
However, in the light of the theoretical claims by neoclassical economists, other 
social scientists, and many global leaders, the existing rich pool of insight and 
ethnographic detail (e.g., Bodomo, 2012; Ozkul and Obeng-Odoom, 2013; Freeman, 
2017; Whitaker, 2017;Park et al., 2016; Sweetland and Edwards, 2019. On compiling 
detailed cases of Chinese or African migration, see Manu, 2005; Chang, 2008; Ngai, 
2016; Xu and Chen, 2019; Tonah et al., 2018) about Afro-Chinese labour migration 
can help to address, perhaps, the three most intractable questions about labour 
migration in political economy. First, why do African and Chinese labour migrants 
move to Africa and China?  Second, what are the socio-economic effects of this 
Afro-Chinese labour migration?  Third, how might migration policy more effectively 
address the process and consequences of labour migration?  
By systematising existing data, this article shows that Afro-Chinese labour migration 
experience is far more complex than what neoclassical economics suggests. Driven, 
or, at least moulded, not so much by the migrant as a rational utility-maximising 
individual but by holistic processes of ‘circular, combined and cumulation causation’, 
Afro-Chinese migration, and Afro-Chinese relations, more generally, have 
contributed to economic growth, but at the cost of much socio-spatial displacement, 
and socio-ecological degradation. Added to these social costs is widespread labour 
 
1 Various studies suggest that the size of Chinese migrant population in Africa increased from 80, 000 to over 750 000 between 1980 and 
2006 (Ancharaz, 2011; Mohan et al., 2014, pp. 3-6). More recently, these migrants are estimated to be between one and two million 
people (see, for example, French, 2014, p. 26; Bodomo and Ma, 2010, p. 286). They work in a wide range of sectors, from mining and 
small-scale manufacturing to trading.  The population of Africans in China is much less but substantially never the less. Currently, there are 
nearly 500, 000 people (Bodomo and Ma, 2010, pp. 283-284), that is, about half the size of the Chinese population in Africa, who live in 
China. These Africans work in various professions, including education, diplomacy, and entertainment. Guandzhou is the single most 
important place of settlement for African migrants. It is estimated that, alone, Guandzhou  hosts 130, 000 Africans (Lee, 2014, p. 20). The 
rest live in cities such as Yiwu (Cissé, 2015, p. 50).Much has also been written  about the estimated 150, 000 Chinese professionals who 
were sent to Africa to work in the agricultural, transport, and telecommunications sectors in the 1960s and the beginning of the 1980s 
(see Mung, 2008, p. 95) but, today, the range of activities in which Chinese migrants are involved is much wider. For example, it is 
estimated that there are between 700 and 800 Chinese companies in Africa, operating in 49 out of the 54 countries on the continent. 
Together, these companies employ about 80, 000 Chinese workers (see Mung, 2008, p. 95). 
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exploitation. So, the insidious attempts by the state, business enterprise, corporate 
finance, and capital to consider migration as a ‘spatial fix’ for economic growth are 
questionable. Seeking to wall out migrants, embarking on widespread surveillance, 
pursuing migrant scape-goating, and framing migration as a Malthusian problem are, 
however, not a panacea. The  social costs of migration need to be directly 
redressed, among others, by redesigning the institutions that shape the conditions of 
labour. Doing so would require leaving behind neoclassical economics theories of 
migration and exposing their vested interests. Social economics theories and 
theorising that more comprehensively addresses the labour migration problematique 
and strongly emphasises the coupling of  migration, economic, and social policy can 
usefully be considered as alternatives. 
To illustrate these arguments, the rest of the article is divided into four sections. 
Circular, Combined, and Cumulative Causation analyses the causes of labour 
migration. The Social Costs of Growth probes the growth-inducing effects of 
migration, and its social costs. Migration Policy examines how migration policy 
attempts to address these tensions and contradictions, while Conclusion: 





2. Circular, Combined and Cumulative Causation  
Labour migration is driven by forces of circular and cumulative causation; not just by 
what mainstream economists call ‘opportunities’  (World Bank, 2017). Business 
cycles are, of course, important as drivers of migration, as J.R. Commons (1907) 
famously argued. Typically, booms attract migrants, while depressions repel them. 
Yet, these business cycles occur within a wider social environment over a long 
period of time, as the evidence systematised in figures 1a and 1b illustrates. 
Consider what Commons (1907, pp. 12-13) described as ‘colonial migration’. Such 
labour migration is not driven by migrants’ rational calculations or their interest in 
business at all. Instead, some 150,000 Chinese were sent to Africa in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries as indentured labour (Yoon, 2019, p.92). They did not freely 
choose to move. They were coerced. In Madagascar, the French led the way: using 
Chinese convicts as conscripts to advance French imperial interests (Treman, 2013). 
The Dutch, British, Portuguese and many others put Chinese labourers to similar 
uses in the rest of Africa (Park, 2019). Many of those who won their freedom stayed 
on, as did  many of their descendants (Duyvendak, 1945; New African Magazine, 
2015; Park, 2019). 
These historical reasons  provide a context for analysing the causes of labour 
migration, but they also create path dependencies, as demonstrated  by historians 
(Hobson, 2004;Akyeampong, 2011).  Figure 1(a) shows three time periods that are 








The reign of Mao Tse-tung (1949-1976) constitute phase one. The rise of Deng 
Xiaoping (1978 - ~1992), phase two, and the period thereafter (post 2001), phase 
three. These three epochs parallel the emphasis on internal self-sufficiency, the 
loosening of internal economic restrictions supplemented with the efflorescence of 
China as an important global player, and the rise of China as a global force typified, 
among others, by China’s acceptance of rules by the World Trade Organisation. In 
Africa, these periods also roughly collocate with pre-independence and the colonial 
period, independence, and post-independence epochs. Pre-independence 
developments were important. The 1955 Bandung Conference embodied the 
collective aspirations of the Global South to  break the chains of colonialism. African 
leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah helped to foster South-South co-operation, which 
often provide the context for migration analysis (see Amoah, 2019 for a detailed 
account of Nkrumahist strategies to promote Ghana-China relations).  
The path dependency created by this early history of migration is striking.  The 
migrants who stayed in Africa directed new comers to various parts of the continent 
where these new migrants  could settle more comfortably. Indeed, early Chinese 
migrants in Mauritius influenced the decision of many South African-based Chinese 
migrants (Yoon, 2019, p.94). Also, as many of these early migrants exported local 
African goods to China (Yoon, 2019), it is plausible that such trade, together with 
other factors, shaped the drivers of Chinese migration to Africa. This is not prima 
facie evidence that Chinese migration to Africa was for opportunity. Many migrants 
created their own opportunities. This creative response, to use Joseph Schumpeter’s 
framing (Shumpeter, 1947) challenges the neoclassical labour economics fixation on 
adaptive response to take rather make opportunities.  
Of course, the more recent turn to neoliberalism has strongly shaped the discourse 
on ‘opportunities’ (Hiafang, 2010; Cheru and Obi, 2010), although this rhetoric is at 
the national level and its theory of entrepreneurship is not as holistic as Schumpeter 
theorised it (Schumpeter, 1947). Most African states court Chinese economic 
engagement, while China is seeking to consolidate its own economic and political 
standing in the global community by courting African engagement. Accordingly, 
Chinese support to Africa is not entirely in solidarity terms. It is  also to promote 
mutual economic interests. In 2000, Beijing voluntarily waived Africa’s $1.2 billion 
sovereign debt to China. In return, between 2000 and 2005, the value of Africa-
China trade increased more than four times. Crucially, since 2000, every year, more 
Chinese entrepreneurs have moved to Africa. In 2006, the number was ten times 
higher than what pertained in 2003 (Arrighi, 2008, p. 207). Today, an estimated 10, 
000 Chinese businesses have been established in Africa.  In monetary terms, 
China’s FDI in Africa has grown substantially. Between 2011 and 2016, Chinese FDI 
in Africa grew  from $16 to $40 billion (The Economist, 2019d, pp. 18-20). Most of 
these investments influence Chinese labour migration to Africa (Ramamurti and 
Hillemann, 2018, pp. 43-44; McVeigh and Dzradosi, 2019). Alone, the Chinese state 
has exported more than 80, 000 Chinese labour migrants to work on Beijing-funded 
FDI projects. At least 80,000 of these migrants have plans of continuing to live in 
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Africa (Hilson et al. 2014, p. 296). Not only do these state initiatives create 
opportunities for small-scale Chinese businesses, Chinese businesses (e.g., roads, 
fishing, or mining) also largely recruit Chinese workers, much like a few African 
businesses (Park, 2019).   
This Chinese path to Africa is even  more striking in the context of state restructuring 
in China. After retrenchments in public sector jobs led to 60 million job losses in 
China in  the mid-1990s and the lowering of the conditions of labour (Bieler and Lee, 
2017, p. 4), Chinese workers demonstrated what Karl Polanyi (1944/2001, p. 79), 
described as a  ‘double movement’. Specifically,  ‘the extension of the market 
organisation in respect to genuine commodities was accompanied by its restriction in 
respect to fictitious ones’. The number of worker strikes increased consistently. The 
number of strikes in 2005, for example, was eight times higher than what pertained 
in 1993 (Arrighi, 2008, p. 377; for recent data and analyses, see Molero-Simmaro, 
2017; The Economist, 2019e). However, migration to Africa appears to have become 
the other path to the double movement.  
The emergence of a new Chinese financial architecture in China facilitates this 
institutionalised alternative (Cheru and Calais, 2010; Cheru and Obi, 2010; 
Sanderson and Forsythe, 2013; French, 2014; Sheridan, 2016; Robertson, 2016). 
Consider the activities of institutions such as China Development Bank, Exim Bank, 
and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. Their lending terms tend to include 
the employment of Chinese and the creation of conditions that support the further 
development of the conditions that would support the efflorescence and flourishing of 
Chinese businesses in Africa. Even when these banks themselves do not impose 
such  conditions; Chinese businesses have tended to hire Chinese labour. These 
institutions do not necessarily take instructions from the Chinese state. They are 
private initiatives intent on making China both the world’s factory and the world’s 
supplier of cheap labour (Bieler and Lee, 2017).   
Thus, in explaining the drivers of migration, it is what J.R. Commons called 
‘institutionalised mind’ that mattes. In his words:  
If it be considered that, after all, it is the individual who is important, then the 
individual with whom we are dealing is the Institutionalized Mind. Individuals 
begin as babies. They learn the custom of language, of cooperation with other 
individuals, of working towards common ends, of negotiations to eliminate 
conflicts of interest, of subordination to the working rules of the many concerns of 
which they are members. They meet each other, not as physiological bodies 
moved by glands, nor as ‘globules of desire’ moved by pain and pleasure, similar 
to the forces of physical and animal nature, but as prepared more or less by habit, 
artificial transactions created by the collective human will. They are not found in 
physics, or biology, or subjective psychology, or in the German Gestalt 
psychology, but are found where conflict, interdependence, and order among 
human beings are preliminary to getting a living. Instead of individuals the 
participants are forces of a going concern. Instead of forces of nature they are 
forces of human nature. Instead of isolated individuals in a state of nature they 
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are always participants in transactions, members of a concern in which they come 
and go, citizens of an institution that lived before them and will live after them 





While personal factors (figure 1b) and migrant agency can be named as part of the 
drivers of Afro-Chinese migration, but they are also shaped by family and other 
reasons (Ho, 2012; Mohan et al., 2014; Rosewarne, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016; 
Castles, 2011, 2012, 2015). The experience of many Chinese women migrants in 
Africa is a case in point. Many of these single, divorced, and less educated women 
consider family pressure to remarry burdensome. Combined with wider social 
expectations in China, migrating to Africa is institutionally and socially constructed as 
an alternative pathway  (Mohan et al., 2014, pp. 71-72, see also pp. 80-81; see 
Mohan et al., 2014, pp. 81-83; Cissé 2015).  
African migration to China confirms this circular and combined causation of 
migration. The Nigerians who send an estimated $8million daily to Guangzhou for 
business transactions (Lee, 2014, p. 32) are driven by a panoply of factors. 
Differential cost of production between Nigeria and China is one of them. The 
prevalence of duty-free regulations that apply to goods exported from China is 
another (Lee, 2014, p.34). The limited opportunity for public sector employment in 
Nigeria is a third factor. Other African migrants first went to China as students. They 
became labour migrants during or after their studies through a mosaic of reasons. 
Consider the social spaces that their education in China opened and inter-marriage. 
These are not necessarily related to business cycles. So, their decisions are shaped 






A circular, combined, and cumulative process is at play in all these examples. After 
the completion of cycles, the next round is not the same. It generates additional 
forces that drive the migration process. That is how the networks and the social 
provisioning in the migration process have arisen and are maintained (Tinti and 
Reitano, 2017). Facilitators of the journey are usually described as ‘people 
smugglers’ in the Anglo-Saxon literature. However, their role is far more complex 
because they are neither just smugglers nor just saviors. They can be both at 
different times and neither at other times, especially when they are sometimes 
migrants themselves. Indeed, they can also be all of these identities at different 
times (Tinti and Reitano, 2017).  
The experiences of internal African migrants in Senegal can further illustrate the 
point. In an economy with few political-economic options, these migrants hire 
themselves out at much lower  wage rates. Chinese shop owners usually hire them 
to run their shops in Dakar. These desperate Senegalese migrants typically have no 
work contracts and are quite often fired without due process (Cissé, 2013). Promised 
a better life, these poor people may migrate for economic, but also other, reasons. 
This social economics of migration recalls how migrants from elsewhere in Accra 
straddle the formal and informal economies (Hart, 1973; Obeng-Odoom, 2011; Ndjio, 
2009, 2014). In this process, other complexities arise that become part of the cycle, 







Consider, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998. It heralded changes in local but also 
wider global political economic systems. Many Africans  from Indonesia and Thailand 
moved to new areas in Asia for these reasons. Guandzhou was one of their major 
destinations (Lan, 2015, p. 292). A migrant town, its allure to new migrants signal 
that migration  decisions are shaped by path dependencies. Yet, these paths can be 
broken, for example, through the implementation of new laws. The Guangdong 
Provincial Government’s anti-migration law (Guangdong Act)  is a case-in-point. This 
law rewards Chinese for reporting Africans who may have overstayed, those who 
enter China illegally, or are involved in any illegality, while punishing Chinese who 
refuse to do so (Lan, 2015).  In contrast, in Yiwu, the trading city in the Eastern 
Province of China, the legal regime is characterised by  programs initiated and 
maintained by its local leaders to support  African migrants. Keen to boost the urban 
economy of Yiwu, these leaders  seek to attract migrants by creating the institutional 
context that makes Yiwu a welcoming city for Africans. The city authories provide 
municipal services to suit its African community (see, for example, Bodomo and Ma, 
2010), for example. Consequently, while Guangzhou has lost many of its African 
labour migrants, between 2006 and 2009, the number of registered Africans in Yiwu 
increased from  20,311 to 54, 050 (Cissé 2015, p. 50). Clearly, migration is a socially 
embedded process whose drivers act  like a relay-race. The processes and networks 
associated with the experience cannot entirely be described as economic or non-
economic. As a socio-economic process, various forces drive diverse activities or run 
their part of the race.  
Illustrating  that  circular, combined, and cumulative causation processes; not utility-
maximising rational choices, drive Afro-Chinese migration shows a lack of 
congruence between neoclassical economics theory and social reality. Although 
problematising the mainstream is important in its own right, the analysis, however, 
shows more than simply telling ‘right’ from ‘wrong’. It also suggests that Afro-Chinese 
migration has historically been part of wider social change. In turn, categorising 
labour as ‘economic migrants’ is quite arbitrary. More fundamentally, the drivers of 
migration are not just about income differences. They are, even more crucially, about 
wider conditions of work and general prevailing socio-economic environment 
internally, internationally, and globally. If migration appears quite historical, is  
widespread, and is a matter of right because we have one earth given to us as a gift, 
then migration can be facilitated. Doing so, however, for the promotion of capitalist 
expansionism, the cheapening of labour and its products, as well as persistent and 
relentless economic growth,  as advocated by mainstream economists (Claussing, 
2019a, 2019b; The Economist, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c)  as a win-win strategy, 
however, is questionable.  The effects of widening growth on the environment (Daly, 
2019) is catastrophic, as are the other social costs of growth. 
 
The Social Costs of Growth 
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Chinese migrants in Africa make substantial contributions to African economic 
growth. Much of this growth is job-led. Consider the establishment of Chinese 
enterprises in Africa. One estimate is that entrepreneurs from China have created 
some 300, 000 jobs for African workers (Mutethya, 2018).  The contribution of 
African labour migrants to urban economic growth in China is  similarly substantial. 
Guangzhou  was an industrial city (Hobson, 2004; Akyeampong, 2011) whose 
economy has now been diversified by the economic activities of African migrants. 
According to Jane Jacobs’ (1969) epigenesis theory, activities such as trade 
transform  the local economy. Exports bring in revenue which, in turn, generates 
further urban economic activities. Growth comes not only from these activities 
themselves but also from their clustering, which generate agglomeration economies. 
The agglomeration of different people also produces  advantages. Alfred Marshall 
described them as knowledge, input, and labour sharing among various firms and 
economic entities working in the urban economy (Obeng-Odoom, 2016, pp. 83-106). 
These advantages spill over to surrounding areas. So, spatial proximity leads to what 
economists call ‘spatial externalities’ (Bara et al., 2017). More fundamentally, migrant 
entrepreneurs themselves innovate by doing new things or old things in new ways. 
Even if these innovations are quite ordinary, as Joseph Schumpeter demonstrated, 
such entrepreneurship drives substantial economic change (e.g., Schumpeter, 
1947). This Schumpeterian theory of interdependent and evolutionary change is 
reflected in more recent experience. 
As one Chinese entrepreneur observed in a study by Lan (2015, p. 297), ‘[w]e 
depend on Africans for business. If our government does not allow them to come, we 
have to close our shops’. More recently, many of the Chinese interviewed in Erica 
Marcus’ research documentary Guangzhou Dream Factory (Marcus, 2017) admitted 
on camera that they are in business because of African labour migrants.  As  many 
Africans cannot operate  legal bank accounts by themselves, they rely on new 
banking forms operated by Chinese residents. Money exchange is another business, 
usually led by Chinese migrants from Northern China (Lan, 2015). Most Africans in 
China are quite well-educated, so they bring valuable skills to Chinese cities. 
Africans teach Chinese and also succeed in employing Chinese in successful 
businesses that they run in China, a finding that challenges the view that Africans 
are lazy workers and are incapable of entrepreneurial success (Mohan et al. 2014). 
Thus, Afro-Chinese labour migration has made various contributions to growth.  
The social costs of this circular, combined, and cumulative economic growth have 
also been substantial. Migrants live a life of uncertainty, a reality which, according to 
J.K. Galbraith, contrasts with the certainties of economic theory, capitalism, and 
socialism (Galbraith, 1977, p.7). Not only do many migrants fail in business, others 
live a life of uncertainty and insecurity, sojourning as temporary migrants on yearly 
residency permits (see Lee, 2014, pp. 29, 33). Migrants’  bi-racial, Afro-Chinese 
families  face widespread racism and ostracism at school and at work. They become, 
as Robert Coles (1971) famously theorised, ‘children of crisis’. The local ‘growth 
machine’ (Molotch, 1976) that generates economic boom in migrant towns based on 
iterative and interactive networks and interactions with locals and institutions 
(Obeng-Odoom, 2016, pp. 83-106; Saunavaara, 2017; Wang and Giovanis, 2019) 
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also creates major problems. A local property market is called forth by the activities 
of African migrants, but Chinese landlords extract significant rent by either letting or 
subletting their shops to Africans. This stream of rental payment enables landlords to 
live as rentiers, capturing rents which are socially created.  
Africans may appear to be winning. After all, the stereotypical view is that many 
African states have not created as many jobs in the public sector. Instead, their 
rhetoric of ‘urban governance’ and, hence, of attracting private initiatives seems to 
be met by increasing Chinese investment (Obeng-Odoom, 2013). Yet, many locals 
have become tenants on their own land. As local land has been leased to Chinese 
investors to develop shops, many of which recruit Chinese workers, many ordinary 
Africans have faced persistent insecurity of tenure. Sometimes too African tenants 
are forced off to find alternative shops or housing because they are priced out of new 
property markets that arise from Chinese property investment. The boom-bust cycles 
in property markets instantiated by speculative urban development creates 
uncertainties, while the increases in land prices, arising from the construction of 
expansive road networks, generate insecurities from increasing property prices.  
That is evidently the experience of Angolans in Luanda. Chinese speculative urban 
development in Angola and its financing have created spatial and social inequalities 
as well as widespread uncertainties especially in Luanda and Kilamba City. One 
indication of the scale of speculation is that apartment prices, previously pegged at 
US$120,000, dropped to US$ 84,200 for want of effective demand. Even then, locals 
have been priced out of housing, leading to the concentration of the  wealthy in  
centralidades (Cain, 2014; Watson, 2014). Similar comments apply to the 
experiences of  other African countries. While many Africans have been recruited by 
Chinese businesses in Rwanda, where China Civil Engineering Construction 
Corporation and New Century Developments has a branch  (Lee, 2014, pp.97-98), 
many Africans work under difficult labour conditions, much like Chinese workers. 
This cheap and precarious labour is extracted in a process that stirs widespread 
ecological costs. 
The experiences of small-scale Chinese miners can help to illustrate the point. Many 
of these miners have left Shanglin gold mining town in China because of the 
depletion of gold in China (Mohan et al., 2014, pp. 98-99). They have been drawn to 
Ghana by private labour contractors operating both in China and Ghana,  including 
Shaanxi Mining (Hilson et al., 2014, pp. 300-301). Generally, the operations of these 
migrant miners in Africa have contributed to major ecological degradation (Beck, 
2012; Mohan et al., 2014, p. 99; Hilson et al., 2014; Obeng-Odoom, 2017). In 
Ghana, ‘a burgeoning illegal Chinese mining population has re-routed rivers and 
flooded roads used by villagers to access markets, seized farmlands unscrupulously, 
and bulldozed moats constructed for agriculture’ (cited in Hilson et al., 2014, p. 292).  
In such a situation, it is tempting to seek arrests of Chinese migrant miners 
themselves, but such a focus neglects an important dynamic. Most of these migrants 
are Chinese minorities, including members of Zhuang, a marginalised people  in 
China. As Chinese ‘untouchables’, these migrants’ uncertainty is heightened in 
Africa, where they live a life of insecurity. They feel unsafe, and are recurrently 
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attacked as victims of scapegoating. While they make some money from mining, 
they use much of this money to support their poor and indebted families and 
communities in China (Botchery et al., 2019, pp. 313-316). Often, these migrants are 
also exploited and are reliant on networks that capitalise on, and reinforce, systems 
of inequality. These social conditions cannot excuse their pillaging of the 
environment, but their actions and inactions must be contextualised to purge it of 
claims about Chinese peculiarities. The identities of facilitators or ‘middlemen’, for 
example, must be a focus of analysis too.  
 
Chinese migrants do not act alone. They are supported by ordinary Africans, 
politicians and local leaders. This local network facilitates the process of transferring 
collectively-held land into individual migrant ownership. Transnational corporations 
(TNCs) are also involved in this process. Their environmental footprint is colossal. 
According to the  Minister for Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation, it 
would cost Ghana US$650 billion to reclaim the environment degraded by the 
combined and cumulative effects of illegal, migrant heavy miningi and the activities of 
TNCs. The ‘social costs’ (Kapp, 1950/1971) are likely to be much bigger (see, for 
example, Le, 2016). The difficulty is that such identities are evolutionary because 
some of them used to be exploited migrants too, as Peter Tinti and Tuesday Reitano 
(2017) demonstrate in another context.  
Still, these networks arise from, and are maintained through, inherent forces of 
inequality and uncertainty which, in general, have largely  been considered to be 
central to social costs under capitalism (Kapp 1950/1971; Ramazzotti et al., 2012). 
J.R. Commons (1907) offered one possible explanation of why they exist. As a key 
driver of migration is the business cycle, Commons used such networks  to illustrate 
how inherent inequality can be in the migration process. In contrast to neoclassical 
argument that migration always pushes prices down, Commons argued that it can 
also cause the prices of goods and services to increase. As immigration causes the 
size of population to grow, blatant or disguised protectionism  can make population 
size outstrip the volume of goods and services. As wages are pushed down because 
there is more labour available than what is socially necessary to maintain production, 
profit levels can be expected to rise dramatically; not just because of rising prices but 
also because of falling cost of production. The effect of migration, then, is to 
concentrate wealth in the hands of capital.  
A similar explanation can be used to show how this process concentrates rent in the 
hands of landlords. The sudden injection of money from migrant mining increases 
land values. This escalation of value is not just from demand, but also from 
speculation (Obeng-Odoom, 2014; Botchwey et al. 2019). The cost of living rises, 
further raising rental levels. The switch in the uses of land from agrarian to mining 
and oil drilling creates similar effects: increasing land values and concentrating their 
resulting rents in the hands of landlords.  
Added to these explanations is the problem of dumping. Chinese exports to Africa 
have paralysed many indigenous textile industries in Africa. These cheap mass-
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produced imitations of local goods close jobs available to local labour. Dumping also 
devalues labour. Workers imported from China hire themselves out at much lower 
labour standards than are locally permitted (Mung, 2008; Akorsu, 2010, pp. 206-
207). With the increasing tendency to import Chinese labour (see, for example 
Obeng-Odoom, 2015), there is a tendency for this practice to force down already low 
prices and lower labour standards in Africa. Similar practices apply among African 
employers in China who exploit the lower cost of labour in China. Many African 
merchants also partake in this ‘dumping’. This  Fordist production processes leads to 
the mass and cheap production of African needs which, the Chinese have come to 
understand, while collaborating with some African traders (Ho, 2012). In turn, the 
profit levels of producers and employers both in Africa and China have increased 
substantially, followed by the declining conditions of work.  This evidence (e.g., 
Aidoo, 2010; Tremann, 2013; Obeng-Odoom, 2017) bears out early predictions by 
J.R. Commons (1907) that  dumping could (1) increase the price of goods and 
services, (2) reduces  in wage levels and (3) raise profit levels. 
These social costs metastasize into  ecological costs. Consider the environmental 
footprint of Chinese labour migrants who work illegal fishing and illegal mining towns 
in Ghana (e.g., Hilson et al., 2014; McVeigh and Dzradosi, 2019). Chinese-
dominated Illegal trawling has not only led to the loss of $65 million to the people of 
Ghana (McVeigh and Dzradosi, 2019, PP. 26-27), it has set into motion a process of 
over fishing. Also, through their use of toxic chemicals such as mercury, many water 
bodies and farm lands have become contaminated and incapable of supporting 
biodiversity and human livelihoods. Biodiversity has declined, injuries have 
multiplied,  and many human lives have been lost, as a result of the activities of 
these migrants (Wilson, 2015, p. 9).  
Such social and ecological costs  existed prior to the involvement of Chinese 
migrants, of course.  However, systematic fieldwork (Thornton, 2014, Hilson et al., 
2014; Wilson, 2015) shows that the advent of Chinese involvement in mining in 
Ghana has dramatically increased the problems. The more advanced technology 
utilised by these migrants enriches productivity considerably. Through expanded 
production, they also generate worse environmental outcomes. More pits can be dug 
shortly, more trees destroyed quickly, a greater number of animals killed more 
efficiently, and larger doses of mercury dispensed off more rapidly. Yet, the widely-
held view that Chinese migrants are at the forefront of this systematic ecocide and 
the production of inequality and social problems must be problematised. Indeed, 
migrants from  other parts of Ghana and other countries in Africa are complicit too.  
Their use of traditional, manual methods of mining (which are less efficient and less 
brutal in their effects on the environment), might extend the time during which their 
ecological footprint can be seen, but they are still environmentally damaging. Other 
groups us more mechanised methods. Such is the case with labour migrants from 
Canada, from Portugal, Russia, and Spain,  from India, the UK, and the USA who 
use even more high-tech mining equipment whose damaging effect on  the 
environment is documented (Wilson, 2015, p. 10). Indeed, the many transnational 
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mining corporations with large and generous concessions and benevolent tax breaks 
that control the mining sector in Ghana are much worse culprits.  
This evidence helps to see the limits of recent debates about the role of the state in 
migration policy. Nationalists sentiments drive the erection of walls, while border 
studies advocate their removal (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2016), humanists prefer the 
win-win trope of temporary migration, integration, and eventual ‘return’ (Obeng-
Odoom, 2017). Yet, as the analysis of Afro-Chinese labour migration shows, the role 
of the state needs to be more carefully analysed.  
 
Migration Policy  
If Afro-Chinese labour migration is characterised by uncertainty, inequality, and 
unsustainability, it is important to revisit the relevance of the two questions typically 
asked about Afro-Chinese labour migration policy (Cheru and Obi, 2010; Lee, 2014; 
Amoah, 2014, 2019): Do African states have clearly designed labour migration policy 
for China? and What about the Chinese state: does it have such a policy?  
Not only are these questions irrelevant, their responses are also misleading. The 
claim that Africa has no Chinese policy, indeed that African states have little or no 
border control policies is one such response. According to Margaret Lee (2014), not 
only is there a lack of policy but there is also a lack of co-operation among African 
states when working with China. For instance, in its dealings with illegal Chinese 
labour immigrants, Margaret Lee claims, the Ghanaian government fails to 
collaborate with the Togolese authorities, although doing so is important to better 
understand how some Chinese pivot to Ghana from Togo (see Lee, 2014, p. 99). 
Another response is that Chinese ‘Go Out’ policy is the Chinese state’s approach to 
encourage emigration from China, while it has a policy of ‘complete control’ of 
migrants within its borders (Graham-Harrison and Garside, 2019).    
These positions are questionable. As Ellen Brennan’s (1984) work has shown, both 
China and Africa seek to restrain  migrants in their territory through border controls 
and labour market regulations about work permits (Brennan, 1984). So, the 
requirement for work permit is one way of controlling migrants.  Both China and 
countries in Africa also institutionalise uncertainty by making Afro-Chinese labour 
migrants temporary. Most of these migrants hold temporary visas. It is rare to find 
permanent African residents in China or, say, permanent Chinese residents in 
Ghana. Both often have punitive regulations against employers of irregular migrants 
and often some reward system for people who report illegal migrants. Even worse, 
both the Chinese and African states adopt expulsion and widespread surveillance of 
migrants. For example, like what pertains in China, in Ghana, the state raids markets 
to confiscate cheap Chinese textiles that are imitations of Indigenous Ghanaian 
prints, using a nationalist discourse to promote a ‘Friday Wear’ of only Indigenous 
textiles, and issuing a fiat that all imports of ‘African’ textiles ought to go through one 
port to improve the effectiveness of monitoring (Axelsson, 2012). The Ghanaian 
state also recurrently prosecutes and deports Chinese migrants whose equipment is 




Table 1: Ghanaian State Control of Chinese Migrants, 2010 - 2018 
Years Prosecutions Deportations Pieces of Equipment 
Confiscated  
2010 – 2013 -  4,500  - 
2013 – 2016 1,405 - - 
2014 – 2017 - 734 - 
2016 – 2017 701 - - 
2017-2018   18,593 
Total 2,106 5,234 18,593* 
Source: Adapted from Debrah and Asante, 2019, p. 297 
* Excavators (1,834); Water pumps (3,100); Vehicles (242); Motor bikes (238); Changfa  
mining machines used for crushing solids (13,179). 
The effectiveness of these approaches is questionable both in Africa (Hilson et al., 
2014) and in China (Lan 2014).  More fundamentally, the typical responses 
systematically neglect the circular, combined, and cumulative causes of migration 
and the social costs that characterise it. The wider question of labour exploitation, 
the effect of unequal property relations on migration, and the resulting stratification 
from the social creation but the private appropriation of rent is similarly neglected. 
Focused exclusively on the state, without taking into account the wide-range of 
institutions that condition migration, both existing and proposed migration policies 
are founded on problematic assumptions. The sustained focus on Chinese racism 
against African labour, often used to justify Chinese exclusive employment practices 
(Lee, 2014), is understandable. However, it must be related to employer tactics to 
keep wages low, divide workers, and control them for the expansion of capital, as 
famously demonstrated by J.R. Commons (1907).  
A new migration policy is needed, but a detailed exposition is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Its ingredients could include developing social regulation of current 
migration processes to facilitate rather than hinder it. As theorised elsewhere 
(Burnazoglu, 2017; Obeng-Odoom, 2017, 2018), the reason for supporting migration 
is largely based on the one earth argument: the idea that all humans have a right to 
freely given land by nature. This proposition strongly recognises the social costs of 
migration for which both social and economic policy can be carefully developed. For 
informal workers outside the realms of documentation, they could self-organise as 
co-operatives or unions. Doing so could provide social networks that can more easily 
negotiate and receive diverse institutional support.  
The activities of such co-operatives could include (a) community development (b) 
ecological development to repair impairments arising from their activities and (c) 
helping to provide their members with social protection obtained from various 
institutions such as the state and all its geographical and functional arms. Indeed,  
these co-ops could propose minimum wage regulations in their areas of work and 
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work with other groups to seek not just better conditions of work but also to work 
less.  
Expansion of the public sector is crucially useful. The point is not to create more 
work, but to redistribute work such that those who are overworked could be relieved 
of their work. Re-activating the spirit of the Bandung conference, permanent 
residency status could more easily be extended to both African and Chinese 
migrants. In any case, it was Chinese indentured labour and the labour of black 
people that collectively strongly contributed to the development of infrastructure in 
Africa. The support of Africa, African states, and peoples to Chinese development is 
similarly monumental. Allaying mutual fears, uncertainties, and insecurities could be 
started by making migrants more permanents, guaranteeing their rights, and 
supporting their activities. Coupled with the expansion of social policy and the direct 
redress of the social costs of migration, including a land and housing policy that 
makes accommodating migrants far more decent in such a way that the conditions of 
labour are improved, this emphasis on making migrants permanent could more 
strongly support migrants. Examples from around the world, including Alaska and 
Singapore (see Haila, 2016; Obeng-Odoom, 2017) suggest that such policies are 
both possible and desirable. 
 
Conclusion: Retheorising the Economics of Labour Migration  
Migration research continues to grapple with key questions. Causation is one of 
them. It is closely associated with debates about migrant agency. The migration-
economy nexus is a  second, while a third question relates to labour migration policy. 
The critical questions are whether migration is driven by the utility-maximising 
rational calculations of migrants and in what ways migrants shape the economy. 
Whether it is through injecting more human capital, more trade, and more investment 
in the economy, the neoliberal theory is that immigration of skilled labour drives 
growth. Conservative critics similarly point to growth as the key test of economic 
progress, but contend that labour migrants reduce growth by taking jobs away from 
locals, depressing wages, and putting pressure on infrastructure. Thus, for 
mainstream economists, migration creates a ‘spatial fix’. According to David Harvey 
(2006, p. 444), “[g]lobal freedom for the movement of capital (in all forms) has 
allowed instant access to the ‘spatial fix’ through geographical expansion within a 
framework of uneven geographical destruction”.  Africa is a ‘spatial fix’ for China’s 
internal problems. China too is a spatial fix for Africa’s internal problems. TNCs and 
micro entrepreneurs across China and Africa must regard migration as a spatial fix 
too, according these neoclassical economists. In a sense, a case of a win-win 
‘migration for opportunity’ is put by many mainstream economists, mainstream 
development institutions, and even humanists. Thus, whether migrants add to or 
take from the economy, the measure of progress is growth (see Clausing, 2019a, 
2019b). 
This is unsatisfactory. Original institutional economics can provide a more holistic 
view. The economy is judged more by its coherence, how it prevents social costs, 
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supports the conditions of labour, and acknowledges ecological limits (Commons, 
1907; Bromley and Anderson, 2012; Bromley, 2019; Abreu, 2012; Burnazoglu, 2017; 
Obeng-Odoom, 2018). With Marxist economics, the most visible opponent of 
neoclassical economics progressively riddled with what J.K Galbraith (1977, p. 7) 
called ‘uncertainty’ both in its critique and alternative policy proposals, it is a good 
time to consider the age-old contention – made by a wide range of institutional 
economists (e.g., Commons, 1907; Myrdal, 1944, 1968; Galbraith, 1977)  - that 





Table 2: Analytical Approach and How it Contrasts with the prevailing paradigm 
Research Questions Analytical Paradigms 
 Neoclassical Economics Original Institutional 
Economics 
Causes The free choices of utility-
maximising rational 
migrants within the 
individuals-centred push-
pull framework 
Circular and cumulative 
causation, involving 
transactions, institutions, 
and individuals  driven by 
‘institutionalised minds’ – 
not homo economicus 
assumptions. 
Effects on the Economy The emphasis is on growth 
and catch-up in an 
economy that can expand 
ad-infinitum without 
systematic regard for 
ecological limits, inequality, 
or other social costs. 
Economic coherence, 
entailing inclusive and 
socio-ecologically 
sustainable transformation 
that is critically conscious 
of ecological and 
planetary limits. 
Migration Policy Focused primarily on 
manipulating the state 
(typically the government) 
to ensure market 
expansion, individual free 
choices, and growth. 
Focused on a 
comprehensive analysis of 
a wide range of 
institutions, including the 
state (government, 
legislature, judiciary, 
media), banks, markets, 




Sources: Based on Commons, 1907, 1934a/2009, 1934b/2009; Myrdal, 1944, 1968; 
Galbraith, 1977; Bromley and Anderson, 2012; Bromley, 2019 
This approach, described briefly in table 2, is far more comprehensive. Circular and 
cumulative causation recognises that causes are not linear, but circular, complex, 
combined, and cumulative, evolutionary and not necessarily the product of sudden 
change. This complexity is not merely additive as in vicious or virtuous circles utilised 
in mainstream economics, but rather cumulative, such that additional circles can 
have a much bigger thrust than previous circles. Interventions could change the 
patterns either upwardly or downwardly at any particular period, but the various 
cycles are not necessarily the same in force or power. The economy is, as Karl 
Polanyi (1957) noted, an ‘instituted process’. Its formal meaning, centred on 
idealised living arrangements in which people act like atoms, that is, act alone to 
make reasoned rational choices for the maximisation of their own utility without 
considering other social relations, society, or environment, poorly reflects reality. 
Rather, the substantive meaning of the economy is more useful. Here, the emphasis 
is on actually existing livelihoods arrangement in which people depend on one 
another and collectively depend on the environment. The success of the economy, 
then, is to judged not so much in terms of growth, but also in terms of the conditions 
of labour, the trends in inequality, and the ramifications for wider society and 
environment. Attaining these hallmarks of the ‘good economy’ must be the 
preoccupation of the state which, interact with other institutions, including landed 
property rights, markets, and banks both spatially and temporally. Individual agency 
is, of course, important, but the individual mind is neither free floating or free 
standing. It is, according to J.R.Commons (1934a/2009; 1934b/2009), 
‘institutionalised’, as it is transactional, that is, often shaped by its social relations, 
including conflicts.  
The state too needs to be retheorised. According to J.R. Common:  
The meaning of the word ‘politics’ has usually been limited to the activities 
designed to get control of what was deemed to be the dominant concern, the 
State. But with the modern emergence of innumerable forms of economic and 
moral concerted action, it is found that the similar complexity of personalities, 
principles, and organizations is found in all concerns. The fact that the sovereign 
concern uses the sanction of physical force has seemed to give dominance to it, 
as indicated by the word, ‘sovereign’. But this is illusory, since, as we have seen, 
sovereignty has been the gradual, but incomplete, extraction of violence from 
private transactions, and other concerns dominate the state (Commons, 
1934b/2009, p. 751). 
So, the near exclusive focus on the Chinese Communist Party when analysing the 
Chinese state is limiting. So, is the neglect of other aspects of the state – including 
the judiciary – (Zhang and Elsner, 2017), especially as in both China and Africa, 
judiciary decisions increasingly impinge on society, economy, and environment 
(Obeng-Odoom and Gyampo, 2017; Fan and Lee, 2019; Zhao, 2019). Dissecting the 
Chinese state or African states in place, while neglecting their evolution over time is 
another limitation of existing research on Afro-labour migration. An evolutionary and 
historical critique of the state (legislature, executive, media, judiciary) that recognises 
20 
 
that the state  could simultaneously be a source of danger and potential, depending 
on the balance of interests that constitutes it and the actions and inactions of the 
other institutions that constitute ‘collective action’ within which the state is moulded.  
This concerted action is also shaped by the nature of the individuals who make up 
the states. Such individuals are not necessarily selfish ‘free agents’ who are simply 
rent-seeking, as claimed by mainstream economists with interest in public choice 
theory. Rather they demonstrate a diversity of the ‘institutionalised mind’, partly 
shaped by local histories and contexts, partly moulded by prevailing global trends, 
and particularly shaped by interests, including whether the state in all its spheres 
(legislature, executive, media, judiciary) has been hijacked by landed interests. 
Taking these matters into account, analysing Afro-Chinese labour migration is clearly 
important. Indeed, crucial in the current political-economic times, partly for verifying 
mainstream thinking, partly for contributing to migration policy, and particularly for 
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